Abstract-In this paper, we study the application of the max-product algorithm (MPA) to the generalized multiple-fault diagnosis (GMFD) problem, which consists of components (to be diagnosed) and alarms/connections that can be unreliable. The MPA and the improved sequential MPA (SMPA) that we develop in this paper are local-message-passing algorithms that operate on the bipartite diagnosis graph (BDG) associated with the GMFD problem and converge to the maximum a posteriori probability (MAP) solution if this graph is acyclic (in addition, the MPA requires the MAP solution to be unique). Our simulations suggest that both the MPA and the SMPA perform well in more general systems that may exhibit cycles in the associated BDGs (the SMPA also appears to outperform the MPA in these more general systems). In this paper, we provide analytical results for acyclic BDGs and also assess the performance of both algorithms under particular patterns of alarm observations in general graphs; this allows us to obtain analytical bounds on the probability of making erroneous diagnosis with respect to the MAP solution. We also evaluate the performance of the MPA and the SMPA algorithms via simulations, and provide comparisons with previously developed heuristics for this type of diagnosis problems. We conclude that the MPA and the SMPA perform well under reasonable computational complexity when the underlying diagnosis graph is sparse.
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I. INTRODUCTION

F
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Digital Object Identifier 10.1109/TSMCB. 2007 .906977 the set of potential failure sources based on available sensory information such as flashing alarms or symptoms. For example, the problem in medical diagnosis is to find the potential disease(s) given the symptoms exhibited by a patient [10] , [11] . Among several proposed formulations for the problem of fault diagnosis, graphical methods (see, for example, [12] - [14] ) have been among the most extensively studied ones. In this paper, we consider a system of N components {S 1 , S 2 , . . . , S N }, which are connected to a set of M alarms {A 1 , A 2 , . . . , A M } for diagnostic purposes. The interactions among them can be represented by a bipartite diagnosis graph (BDG) with two sets of nodes (corresponding to the sets of components and alarms) and the connections between them. Note that the BDG representation has been commonly adopted in medical diagnosis [10] , [15] , where the components and the alarms correspond to diseases and symptoms, respectively. In addition, other graphical models, such as Rao's directed system graph [14] , can also be converted into a corresponding BDG.
We restrict our attention to zero-time systems, i.e., systems in which the fault propagation from the components to the alarms is taken to be instantaneous [14] , and we treat the reliability of alarms and alarm connections separately. This allows our model to be more general than both the symmetrical and asymmetrical tests [16] , [17] which have appeared in the literature (see also [18] , where the model was first introduced). For instance, the asymmetrical test (or the noisy-OR gate [19] , [20] ) is a special case of our proposed general model. Note that our model is more general, because connection failures cannot capture the "false-alarm" situation (alarms are assumed to be reliable in the noisy-OR gate model). Further discussion on the differences and similarities between our approach and these earlier approaches is postponed until Section II, where our exact model is presented.
In general, the multiple-fault diagnosis (MFD) problem of finding the "optimum" solution (i.e., the most likely combination of faults given the alarm observations) is known to be NP-hard [21] - [24] . The challenge is that different components may fail with different probabilities and different connections may propagate the (fault or no fault) conditions of the components they are connected to with unequal likelihoods. To deal with the computational difficulty of the diagnostic problem, numerous approximate methods using heuristic algorithms have been proposed; these include the competition-based connectionist method [25] , Lagrangian relaxation and subgradient optimization methods [17] , the primal heuristic algorithm [26] , and others. In particular, the application of belief-propagation (BP) methods to the problem of MFD has been studied by several groups [see [27] for a thorough introduction on BP algorithms (BPAs)]. In the following, we quickly review pertinent earlier work.
Heckerman [10] proposed an algorithm to determine the exact marginal posterior probability for each disease, given any combination of findings (symptoms). However, the approach is limited to asymmetrical systems with reliable alarms, and the algorithm developed has complexity that is exponential in the size of positive findings. In [6] , Deng et al. presented a probabilistic method (with polynomial complexity) that can be used on the Bayesian network of a communication system. Deng's approach uses the conditioning technique for probabilistic inference and combines it with the irreducible disjunctive normal form of Boolean algebra. Given the alarm observation, the proposed algorithm is capable of finding the posterior marginal probability for each node of interest but not for a combination of components. Fault diagnosis using BP techniques has also been proposed by several other authors (see, for example, [4] , [7] , and [28] ); however, most of these works focus on applying various BP techniques to the problem of fault diagnosis without any theoretical analysis of the performance of the proposed algorithms. In [29] , Rish provided a lower bound on the diagnostic error when bitwise most likely diagnosis (biterror rate) is used. There are limited results on upper bounds on the probability of erroneous diagnosis for BPAs (a simple upper bound is provided in our early work in [18] ).
Inspired from the BPAs used for iterative decoding of lowdensity parity check codes (see [30] and references therein), our earlier work showed that the BPA performs almost optimally when the connection density between components and alarms is low and when the alarms and/or connections are unreliable [18] . However, since the BPA determines the solution based on the marginal posterior probabilities of each component, it is prone to making erroneous decisions in terms of finding the most likely combination of components. This occurs even in "simple" cases where the associated BDG is acyclic.
In this paper, we apply to the fault-diagnosis problem a BP method called the max-product algorithm (MPA). The MPA operates by iteratively performing local-likelihood maximization of all possible fault combinations of components/alarms in the neighborhood of each component/alarm. The intuition behind our algorithm can be seen in the case of an acyclic BDG (ABDG) using the principles of dynamic programming: in that case, the resulting algorithm is reminiscent to the beliefrevision algorithm in [27] . The MPA has been applied to decoding (see, for example, [31] ) and to the fault-diagnosis problem [28] . However, in most of the previous work on MFD using BP techniques, the alarms are assumed to be reliable. This assumption may not be valid in many applications, including cases where direct access to the alarm outcomes is limited. In this paper, we develop the MPA for fault diagnosis in general systems, where both connections and alarms can be unreliable; our development can be understood easily without prior knowledge of BP.
Using the above perspective as the starting point, we also develop the sequential MPA (SMPA), which is an improved MPA that is guaranteed to be better than the original MPA in ABDGs; it also appears to perform better in arbitrary bipartite graphs (with cycles). Our framework allows us to analytically characterize the performance of the MPA given certain alarm patterns; as a result, for a (rather general) class of systems, we obtain an upper bound on the probability that the MPA makes an erroneous diagnosis. In summary, the contributions of this paper are as follows: 1) generalization of the MFD problem to include unreliable connections and alarms, and development of a fault-diagnosis framework that allows us to devise and understand the BP MPA without any prior knowledge of BP; 2) analysis of the proposed algorithm and, based on the results, proposal of an improved algorithm (SMPA); and 3) derivation of upper bounds on the probability of erroneous diagnosis for both proposed algorithms.
The organization of this paper is as follows. In Section II, we formulate the generalized MFD (GMFD) problem using weighted BDGs and describe different types of systems under diagnosis according to the reliability of the connections and alarms. In Section III, we develop the MPAs using a graphicalinference method for general systems. We then analyze the performance of those algorithms given some particular alarmobservation patterns and obtain bounds on the probability of erroneous diagnosis in Section IV. Examples, simulation results, and comparisons with previously proposed algorithms for MFD are provided in Section V. We conclude in Section VI.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
Consider a system of N components (or potential failure sources) {S 1 , S 2 , . . . , S N } equipped with a set of M alarms {A 1 , A 2 , . . . , A M }, such that, each alarm connects to (i.e., it can diagnose) a subset of the components. Under normal operation, an alarm activates whenever any of the components it connects to malfunctions.
The fault-diagnosis model of the overall system can be represented by a BDG, which is defined as follows.
Definition 1: The BDG G = (S, A, E) associated with the fault-diagnosis model of a system with N components and M alarms is a graph having two disjoint sets of nodes, S = {S 1 , S 2 , . . . , S N } corresponding to the set of components and A = {A 1 , A 2 , . . . , A M } corresponding to the set of alarms, and a set of connections E : E mn ∈ E if component S n is "connected" to alarm A m . Fig. 1 represents the BDG associated with a system of N = 5 components and M = 3 alarms. We draw components as upper nodes and alarms as lower nodes of the graph. Note that, in this paper, we focus on the analysis of the MPAs on the BDG associated with each system; therefore, we use the words system and BDG interchangeably. We also define an ABDG to be a BDG without cycles. We denote the state of the components and the alarms via a binary value. In particular, component S n = 1 if S n is faulty; otherwise, S n = 0. In the classical symmetrical system [16] , where the connections and the alarms are reliable, each alarm performs the OR operation of the states of the components it is connected to, i.e., if at least one of the components connected to alarm A m is faulty, the alarm turns "ON" (A m = 1); otherwise, it stays "OFF" (A m = 0). In addition, note that, besides a BDG, a symmetrical system can equivalently be represented by the associated test matrix T = [t mn ], where t mn = 1 if connection E mn exists and t mn = 0, otherwise. For example, the test matrix associated with the symmetrical system having the BDG in Fig. 1 is
In this paper, we consider a more general formulation of the fault-diagnosis problem by allowing the connections and the alarms to be unreliable. For unreliable connections, we allow the state of the component and the input to the connected alarm (after propagation) to differ. More specifically, each connection E mn from component S n to alarm A m is associated with two parameters t x mn , x = 0, 1, which are the conditional probabilities that state S n = x at component S n propagates successfully to the end of the connection E mn as the input to alarm A m [see Fig. 2(a) ]. Assuming that the alarms are reliable and allowing only the connections to be unreliable, we have the X model where each connection is associated with two parameters t x mn , x = 0, 1. A special case of the X model is when t 0 mn = 1 and t 1 mn < 1, which was called the Z model 1 in our previous work [18] . In addition, note that the symmetrical system aforementioned is another special case of the X model, where t 0 mn = t 1 mn = 1. More generally, when performing the OR operation of their inputs, alarms are also allowed to be unreliable in that the result of the OR operation can be erroneously generated/observed. We use the model in Fig. 2 m ≤ 1 is the conditional probability that the observation is A m = x given that the result of the OR operation is x. Combining this alarm unreliability 1 This class of systems is also called noisy-OR [19] , [20] or asymmetrical systems [17] . The term "Z model" is used because the connection model in Fig. 2(a) with t 0 mn = 1 resembles the Z letter. This is also the reason why the unreliable-connection model in Fig. 2(a) is called the "X model," and the most general model with unreliable connections and unreliable alarms in Fig. 2(c) is called the "Y model."
with the unreliable-connection model above, we have the most general Y model in Fig. 2(c) , which allows both connections and alarms to be unreliable. Accordingly, the diagnosis graph associated with the Y model is called the generalized BDG (GBDG). Note that, to represent this GBDG, we need two test matrices T x for x = 0, 1 (for all unreliable connections), and two parameters Pa x m for x = 0, 1 for each unreliable alarm. We use S to denote the combination of the states of the N components (i.e., component S n is fault-free (S n = 0) or faulty (S n = 1) for n in {1, 2, . . . , N}) and A to denote 2 the combination of the M alarm outcomes (i.e., A m = 0 or A m = 1 for m in {1, 2, . . . , M} depending on the observation). In later sections, we also use S U and A V to denote the combination of the states of components in the set U and the combination of the outcomes of alarms in the set V, respectively.
Assuming that each component S n , n = 1, 2, . . . , N has a prior probability of faulty (S n = 1) and successful (S n = 0) operation given by p 1 n and p 0 n , respectively, and under the common assumption that a priori components, connections, and alarms fail independently, the GMFD problem is to find the maximum a posteriori probability (MAP) combination S * of components given the observation A of alarm outcomes. This can be formulated as
Notice that this GMFD problem is more general than the standard MFD problem in that both connections and alarms in the BDG can be unreliable. The assumption that a priori components, connections, and alarms fail independently is common practice in several applications, including medical diagnosis [10] or communication networks [6] . As we hint in the Conclusion, we believe that there are ways to relax these assumptions (and still use variations of the MPA and the SMPA that are proposed here) but that is not the focus of this paper.
The GMFD problem of finding the "optimum" (MAP) solution to (1) is NP-hard [21] - [24] . For this reason, several researchers have studied heuristics for the problem (see, for example, [17] , [25] , [26] ). In this spirit, we study in the next section suboptimal MPAs for solving the GMFD problem under the most general Y model. 
III. MPAs FOR GMFD
We start by introducing the definition of belief as used in the MPAs.
Definition 2: Given any alarm observation, the marginal most likely probability (MMLP) associated with each state of component S n (could be zero or one) is the conditional probability of the most likely combination of component states with the constraint that S n is fixed at that particular "marginal" state of interest.
For example, given the alarm observation A, the MMLP of component S 2 at state 0 in Fig. 1 is MMLP
Following the framework in [18] , we first devise a local iterative algorithm to determine the MMLP associated with each state of each component (given a set of alarm observations) in an ABDG. Then, we extend the results to develop the MPA for the problem of GMFD for an arbitrary GBDG that is not necessarily acyclic (note that the resulting MPA is reminiscent to Pearl's "belief-revision" algorithm in [27] and is guaranteed to reach the optimal solution in an ABDG as long as this (optimal) solution is unique). Finally, by applying the MPA sequentially to the BDG, we obtain an improved algorithm, called SMPA, which guarantees that, for an ABDG, a consistent solution is reached even when there are multiple most likely solutions. The performance of the MPA and the SMPA is discussed in Section V.
A. Probabilistic Inference for ABDG
Let N (m) = {S n : t We also use N (m)\n to denote the set N (m) with component S n excluded, and M(n)\m to denote the set M(n) with alarm A m excluded. Given an ABDG, we can construct an equivalent tree structure rooted at each component S n (refer to Fig. 3 ): alarms A m ∈ M(n) form the intermediate layer, all components S n ∈ N (m)\n for each alarm A m form the first layer below S n , and so on. Let L n denote the set of components in the first layer from S n .
Assume for now that the alarm outcomes are conditionally independent given the set of components that have failed. Using this assumption (and the fact that components fail independently), we can prove the following lemma.
Lemma 1: For any component S n of a given ABDG, let E N be the observed state of all alarms A m ∈ M(n) (i.e., A m = 0 or 1, depending on the observed outcome of alarm A m ). Then, the ratio of the MMLP for each state of S n is given by (2) , shown at the bottom of the page, where the maximization is over all possible combinations of the components in the appropriate set.
Proof: Using Bayes' rule and the assumption that all components are independent, we get
Since all alarms are assumed to be conditionally independent, for the tree in Fig. 3 , we have
and we can bring the max of (3) inside the product of (4), therefore
Similarly, we have
To obtain (2), we divide (5) by (6) . Since all components are independent, we can write
the maximization in (2), for the MMLP of the components in the first layer, we need the MMLP of the components in the second layer, and so on. Iteratively, using Lemma 1, we can also find the MMLP of each component S n in the first layer by excluding the alarm A m connected to S n in the product of (2). By induction, this process can be used to determine the MMLP for each state of each component in the ABDG. An example of how this works can be found in the next section. Before applying the iteration process above to develop the MPAs for the MFD problem, we introduce some notation that allows us to obtain the maximization of (2) 
mk , x = 0, 1 be the parameters of each local connection from alarm A m to the renamed component
where the local component S k corresponds to the global component S n . In addition, let P 0 mk and P
. . , L m ) be the probabilities that component S k is zero or one. It must be emphasized that the renaming process is only used for the maximization of (2) and the usage of S k , as well as τ x mk is local within each set N (m)\n in that, once we move to another set of components, a new renaming process applies.
and
Recall that, under the Y model, each alarm A m can also be unreliable and is associated with two parameters Pa (7) and (8), we have the following two cases:
2) If
By replacing (9) and (10) into (2), we can determine the MMLP for each component (note that these MMLPs are determined by the product of the maximization on the righthand side of (2); this explains the term max product). These probabilities are used in the MPAs for the MFD problem, which are discussed in the following sections.
B. Max-Product Algorithm
Following the discussion after the proof of Lemma 1, we can use the same iterative process to find a solution of the GMFD problem that is not necessarily optimal since the associated BDG may contain cycles. Note that this suboptimal MPA is similar to the BPA which obtains the "pseudo" posterior marginal for each component (for more details on BPAs, see [18] and [27] ); the main difference between the two algorithms is that, in the MPA, the summation operator is replaced by the maximization (in the following, we describe the algorithm in more detail).
The MPA iteratively updates the beliefs Pd mn is the conditional probability of the most likely combination of all components in N (m)\n, given that alarm A m is satisfied and S n = x. At each iteration, the beliefs Pd's propagate downward from the components to the alarms to update Pu's, and the beliefs Pu's propagate upward from the alarms to the components to update Pd's. Using the results in Lemma 1, the MPA for the GMFD problem can be presented as follows.
1) Initialization: We initialize using the prior probabilities by setting
for every connection (m, n).
2) Iteration:
a) Downward step: In this step, we run through all alarms A m and, for each component S n ∈ N (m), we compute Pu x mn 's using (7)- (10) c) Termination: After an appropriate number of iterations (which is discussed later), the MMLP for each state x = 0, 1 of component S n is calculated as
Finally, the state of the nth component in the solution of the MFD problem is determined by the threshold decision
Example: To illustrate how the beliefs are updated, consider the system in Fig. 4 with N = 3 components and M = 2 alarms. Assume that all connections and alarms are reliable (symmetrical system) and the priors of component failures are p 2) In the downward step, since the alarms and connections are reliable, using (13) for connection E 12 , we get
= max Pd In the upward step, from (14) and (15), we have 3) We continue in the same fashion in the next iteration.
The beliefs on other connections are similarly updated, and the results are given in Table I . After I = 2 iterations, the MMLP for each component is determined using (16) , and the solution of the MPA is S 1 = 0, S 2 = 0, and S 3 = 1 via threshold decision (17) . It can be easily verified that the MPA solution in this example is optimal. Note that the BDG in Fig. 4 does not have any cycles.
We now briefly discuss some implementation issues. (11)- (17)]; under the logarithmic operation, products become summations, which further simplifies the algorithm implementation.
2) Let I be the number of iterations. When applying the MPA to an ABDG, the algorithm propagates at each iteration the beliefs from the components to the alarms (in the downward step) and back to the components (in the upward step); therefore, the minimum number of iterations for the MPA to determine the exact state associated with the most likely solution(s) for each component is 
. Because of this reason, in this paper, we only focus on applying the MPA to systems with small L (for simulation purposes, L is usually limited to L ≤ 10). Clearly, if L is a small value and I is set to min(M, N ), then the complexity of the MPA is quadratic in M or N .
We now consider the convergence of the MPA on an ABDG. Theorem 1: Given an ABDG, the MPA always converges to the exact MMLP for each component based on alarm observations.
Proof: See [27, Sec. 5.3.3]. Using Theorem 1, we can analyze the performance of the MPA in terms of finding the most likely combination of components. In this context, first of all, we define correct and erroneous diagnosis as follows.
Definition 3: An algorithm makes a correct (or erroneous) diagnosis when it produces (or does not produce) the most likely combination of component failures given a set of alarm observations.
Corollary 1: Given an ABDG and given an alarm observation that corresponds to a unique most likely combination of components, the MPA always makes the correct diagnosis. Proof: From Theorem 1, we know that the MPA always returns the correct MMLP for each component given any ABDG. By contradiction, we conclude that the decision based on the MMLP must coincide with the state of that component in the most likely solution (otherwise, the assumption of a unique solution would be violated).
Corollary 1 states that, by using the component-based decision in (17) , the MPA results in the most likely combination (configuration) of components as long as there is a unique such configuration. However, when multiple most likely combinations exist (i.e., combinations with equal likelihood), the MPA can lead to an erroneous result. In order to overcome this problem of the MPA, we develop an algorithm that applies the MPA sequentially to the MFD problem and which can provably produce the most likely solution in an ABDG. This is what we discuss next.
C. Sequential MPA
The SMPA essentially consists of multiple applications of the MPA to the GBDG problem. For each application, it uses the MMLPs to decide the corresponding state of only one new component. At the next application, we fix the states of the components, which have been determined up to that point, and we reapply the MPA; we continue this until all components are decided. We emphasize here that we do not determine the conditional MMLP sequentially at each application of the MPA; instead, we still find the MMLP of each component by maximizing over all possible combinations of the other components with the constraint that the states of the components decided previously be fixed to the values decided before.
In order to apply the MPA sequentially, we also need to define the order in which the state of each component is to be determined. Our proposed SMPA uses an order that is based on choosing the maximum MMLP among all remaining components after each application of the MPA; however, it can be easily modified to follow any predefined order of component decision. The SMPA is presented formally as follows.
1) Initialization:
The initialization is identical to that of the MPA for every connection (m, n) except if S n was determined previously, in which case, we let
for all applicable m.
2) Iteration:
a) Downward step: Similar to the MPA, Pu x mn 's are updated using (9), (10), and (13). b) Upward step: For all components, if S n was already determined, assign Pd 0 mn and Pd 1 mn using (18) and (19) , otherwise, update them using (14) and (15). 3) Termination: After an appropriately predetermined number of iterations, the MMLP for each state x = 0, 1 of all remaining components is returned from (16) . We choose the highest MMLP, then fix the component associated with this MMLP at the corresponding state. If there is no component left, the SMPA is complete; otherwise, we go back to Initialization.
As in the case of MPA, we implement the SMPA using logarithmic beliefs to avoid numerical issues when beliefs become too small. Since we apply the MPA sequentially until all components are decided, the complexity of the SMPA is
. In the case of acyclic diagnosis graphs, the performance of the SMPA is improved over that of the MPA, at the cost of increasing complexity from quadratic in terms of M and N in MPA to cubic 4 in SMPA. The SMPA has improved performance because it is able to return the most likely combination of component states even when multiple most likely combinations exist. This is argued in the next corollary.
Corollary 2: Given an ABDG, the SMPA (for any order of component decision) always makes the correct diagnosis.
Proof: Without loss of generality, assume that the order of component decision when sequentially applying the MPA is S 1 , S 2 , . . . , S N . In addition, assume that, after the first round, the state of the first component is S 1 = S * 1 . Following Theorem 1, for the ABDG, the MMLP of S 1 is correct; therefore, there is at least one most likely combination of components that contains S * 1 , and this combination of components is also a possibility in the second round (since all we do is set S 1 = S * 1 and repeat the original iteration). Similarly, if we let the decision after the kth round be S k = S * k , then there always exists at least one most likely combination that satisfies S 1 = S * 1 , S 2 = S * 2 , . . . , S k = S * k . Therefore, after the SMPA completes, the resulting combination is also the most likely solution (not necessarily unique); this completes the proof.
Note that, due to the exponential dependence with respect to L, both the MPA and the SMPA are only applicable to systems with a limited number of connections per alarm. It should be emphasized, however, that, when designing systems with the intention of using the MPA or the SMPA, this implies that we should avoid connecting too many components under diagnosis to a certain alarm; in such case, the limitation on L will not be an issue in applying the MPA and SMPA to several real-world systems. The following section gives some theoretical analysis of the performance of the MPA and SMPA. In Section V, the performance of SMPA and MPA for general BDGs with cycles is studied via simulation; our observations there also reenforce the idea that the performance of the SMPA is superior to that of the MPA.
IV. PROBABILITY OF ERRONEOUS DIAGNOSIS USING MPAs
Corollaries 1 and 2 imply that, when there are multiple most likely combinations of components, the MPA can make an erroneous diagnosis, whereas the SMPA always finds the most likely solution (assuming in both cases that the underlying BDG is acyclic). Using this property, we can derive an upper bound on the probability of reaching an erroneous diagnosis (using either of the two algorithms) for special classes of systems that are not necessarily acyclic. We start by considering the behavior of the MPA in the MFD problem when some of the alarms are "OFF" (A m = 0).
Definition 4: When applying the MPA to a BDG, an alarm is called an absorption node when the ratio of the outgoing beliefs Pu 0 /Pu 1 from that alarm does not depend on the beliefs Pd's coming downward to that alarm.
Before explaining the interpretation of the absorption node in Corollary 3, we establish below the necessary and sufficient conditions for an alarm to become an absorption node.
Lemma 2: In a BDG with reliable alarms (i.e., under the Z or X model), an alarm is an absorption node if and only if there is only one component connected to that alarm or if that alarm is "OFF."
Proof: To prove sufficiency, consider an alarm A m that is "OFF" (i.e., A m = 0). Under the Z or X model, we have 
where Y b (x) and P b were defined in (7) and (8) . Replacing Y b (x) and P b into (20), we get
Note that, for the kth binary digit of b, we always have
moreover, in (13), the MPA uses global quantities Pd . (24) Note that we can also obtain (24) by using the property that the output of the OR operation is zero if and only if all of its inputs are zero.
From (24), the ratio of the outgoing beliefs from alarm A m is
which is obviously independent of the beliefs Pd's coming downward to A m . In addition, it is easily verified from (7)- (10) and (13) that, when there is only one component S n connected to alarm A m , the outgoing beliefs Pu x mn from A m remain unchanged over the iteration process, which makes A m an absorption node.
To prove necessity, assume that alarm A m is "ON" (A m = 1) and connected to at least two components. With reliable alarms, from (10) and (13), the belief Pu 
By replacing Y b (x) and P b from (7) and (8) into (26) and after some simple manipulations, it can be seen that the ratio Corollary 3: Applying the MPA to the BDG of a system with reliable alarms is the same as applying the MPA to an equivalent BDG that is constructed from the original one by decoupling all connections to the "OFF" alarms, such that, each connection is terminated by a separate "OFF" alarm (for example, see Fig. 5 ).
Proof: Corollary 3 follows from the result in Lemma 2 and from the fact that using the ratio of the beliefs coming to each component from the connected alarms is sufficient for the threshold decision for that component after the MPA terminates. In other words, an "OFF" alarm acts like an absorption node.
As a result of Corollary 3, the alarms that are "OFF" inherently localize the BP of the MPA; in fact, they can divide the system into smaller independent subsystems, which are defined as follows.
Definition 5: A subsystem is a BDG G = (S , A , E ) that is constructed from the original BDG G = (S, A, E), such that, S ⊆ S, A = S n ∈S M(n), and E ⊆ E is the set of all possible connections from every component in S (as captured by E). Two subsystems G = (S , A , E ) and G = (S , A , E ) are said to be independent under the MPA for a given set of alarm observations if any change in the beliefs propagating in one subsystem does not effect the beliefs in the other subsystem.
Lemma 3: When using the MPA under the Z or X models, assume that G = (S, A, E) is divided into Q independent subsystems G 1 , G 2 , . . . , G Q , where G q = (S q , A q , E q ) for a given alarm observation. Then, we have the following properties.
1) All subsets S q are disjoint, i.e., S q S r = ∅ with q = r, q, r ∈ {1, 2, . . . , Q}; and
then A m = 0. 3) Components of different independent subsystems are conditionally independent given the alarm observation. 4) The fault-diagnosis problem of finding the most likely solution of the original system is also divided into identical subproblems for each subsystem. Proof: Property 1) follows the definition of independent subsystems. Using the result in Lemma 2, we obtain property 2), which essentially means that any sharing of alarms between independent subsystems must be associated with alarms that are "OFF."
To prove property 3), consider two independent subsystems G q , G r , and let A qr = A q A r be the set of shared alarms. From property 2), all alarms in A qr must be "OFF," and using Corollary 3, we can decouple all connections to the alarms in A qr ; the resulting subsystems G q and G r are obviously not connected to each other, resulting in property 3) which implies 27) and, thus, property 4). Using the properties in Lemma 3, we can analyze the performance of the MPAs under some special patterns of the alarm observations.
Lemma 4: For an arbitrary BDG (not necessarily acyclic) with reliable alarms (i.e., under the Z or X model), the MPA and SMPA always produce the most likely solution when all the alarms are "OFF" (A = A 0 ). Proof: From Lemma 2, when all alarms are "OFF," the original system can be divided into independent subsystems composed of a single component and all alarms connecting to it; therefore, from property 3) of Lemma 3, all components are conditionally independent (note that we can also obtain this result from the first part of [18, Lemma 2] and, in fact, it is easy to show that looking at equivalent decoupled BDGs does not affect the likelihood of component states). In addition, since each subsystem that contains a single component is obviously a tree with a unique most likely solution, 5 the MPA and the SMPA return the most likely solution for that component (from Corollaries 1 and 2); from property 4) of Lemma 3, we can put together the most likely solutions for each subsystem and obtain the most likely solution for the overall system. Definition 6: A first-order pattern (A 1 ) of alarm observations is a pattern such that all of the "ON" alarms (A m = 1) belong to M(n) for a single component S n .
Lemma 5: Given a BDG under the Z or X model (reliable alarms) with cycle length greater than four, if the alarm observation happens to be a first-order pattern, the SMPA always finds the most likely solution. If, in addition, the most likely solution is unique, then the MPA also finds the most likely solution.
Proof: Given an alarm observation that is a first-order pattern, we can construct subsystem G 1st = (S 1st , A 1st , E 1st ) , where S 1st = {S n : ∃A m ∈ M(n) s.t. A m = 1} is the set of all components that connect to the "ON" alarms, and A 1st and E 1st are defined according to Definition 5. All the alarms of the remaining subsystem G remain are "OFF"; therefore, G remain and G 1st are independent subsystems and, moreover, the MPA always produces the most likely solution for G remain (from Lemma 4).
For subsystem G 1st , we first decouple all connections to the "OFF" alarms (if they exist) using Corollary 3. We now show that the resulting BDG is acyclic by contradiction: If the TABLE II Z MODEL SYSTEM A graph contains a cycle, then (since we have already decoupled the "OFF" alarms) all alarms of this cycle have to be "ON." However, according to Definition 6 of a first-order pattern, there exists a single component which connects to these "ON" alarms; moreover, for the existence of a cycle, there also exists another component, which connects to at least two "ON" alarms, which means that the original BDG contains a cycle of length four. This contradicts the assumption that the cycle length is greater than four. Therefore, we conclude that the resulting BDG is a tree, and the proof is completed by using Corollaries 1 and 2, and property 4) of Lemma 3.
Lemmas 4 and 5 allow us to upper bound the performance of the MPAs with respect to the optimal one as follows.
Theorem 2: Consider a system with reliable alarms under the Z model and with an underlying BDG having cycle length greater than four. Assume that all prior probabilities are equal p 1 n = p; then, the probability of erroneous diagnosis using the SMPA is upper bounded by
The same bound holds for the MPA if, in addition, we assume 6 that there is a unique most likely combination of components given any first-order pattern of alarm observations or when all alarms are "OFF." Proof: Using Lemmas 4 and 5, the SMPA always finds the most likely solution when all alarms are "OFF" (A = A 0 ) or with any first-order pattern (A = A 1 for some first-order pattern A 1 ) of alarm observations; therefore
Under the Z model, it is obvious that, if all components are fault-free, all alarms are "OFF," so
In addition, if there is only one faulty component, we always observe a first-order pattern alarm combination (because 6 Although the priors are assumed equal, this can still be a reasonable assumption because connections can have different parameters tmn = t 1 mn (see also the discussion in Section V-A1 ).
alarms can only turn "ON" if a connected component is faulty); therefore All possible first-order patterns A 1
By replacing (30) and (31) into (29), we obtain (28). The proof for MPA follows if we assume that there is a unique most likely solution given any first-order pattern of alarm observations or when all alarms are "OFF." From Theorem 2, it can be seen that, for p 1, the conditional probability of making erroneous diagnosis conditioned on some components being faulty (i.e., if we exclude the trivial case when all components are fault-free) is upper bounded by (N − 1)p/2. As a consequence, when using the MPAs in systems where the prior probability p is very small (e.g., electronic systems [32] ), the probability of making erroneous diagnosis if some of the components in the system are faulty is very small. In such cases, one can take advantage of the results in Theorem 2 to design the alarms appropriately (i.e., such that the cycle length is greater than four) and, then, apply the MPA or the SMPA to make the diagnosis decision with high confidence.
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we apply the MPA and the SMPA to different types of BDGs to analyze the performance of the proposed algorithms and verify the theoretical results in Section IV. We also provide comparisons with previously developed heuristics for the MFD problem.
A. Acyclic BDGs
Example 1: System A has ten alarms and ten components under the Z model as described by the test matrix T A in Table II . Note that the underlying BDG is acyclic (ABDG). Since the diameter of the ABDG of System A is D = 14, the number of iterations of the MPA and the SMPA is set to I = D/2 = 7. For this system, we use 1000 sets of different prior probabilities (randomly generated by assuming that each prior probability is an independently identically distributed (i.i.d.) random variable uniformly distributed between 0 and 0.1); for each set of priors, we consider each of 2 M = 1024 possible alarm outcomes and count the number of times when the MPA and the SMPA make the correct decision. 7 The results are reported in the histograms of Fig. 6 .
For comparison, we also include in Fig. 6 the results of running the BPA, whose decision is based on the marginal posterior probability for each component [18] . We observe that the MPA and SMPA always find the most likely combination of components, which verifies the results in Corollaries 1 and 2 (note that, because the priors are generated randomly, it is highly unlikely that there are multiple most likely solutions given an alarm observation). Note that both MPAs are much better than the BPA for the acyclic bipartite graph.
System B with test matrix T B , as in Table III , is an ABDG with multiple most likely solutions. Our simulation results show that, out of a total of 2 M = 1024 possible combinations of alarms, the MPA only makes 384 correct decisions while the SMPA always finds the most likely solution; this verifies the result of Corollary 2. The improvement of the SMPA performance over the MPA is also present in bipartite graphs with cycles, which are discussed in the next example.
B. MPA Versus SMPA on GBDGs
Example 2 (Small System Under Z Model): We quantitatively define a small system as a system where we can exhaustively search for the most likely solution of all possible alarm observations within our computational capability. System C is a small system under the Z model with M = 10 alarms, N = 10 components, and with the test matrix shown in Table IV , chosen such that the associated BDG has some cycles.
We consider 1000 sets of different priors randomly chosen between 0 and 0.1. For each set of priors, we try all possible alarm combinations and run the MPA, SMPA, and BPA on System C with the number of iterations in all algorithms set to I = min(M, N ) = 10. We then determine the probability of diagnosis error P e by summing all probabilities of the alarm observations, which lead to an erroneous decision. Among 1000 randomly generated sets of priors, there are only seven sets (or 0.7%) in which the SMPA has higher P e than that of the MPA. From the histograms in Fig. 7 , we also see that the MPA is better than the BPA (in terms of the number of correct decisions out of the 2 M = 1024 possible alarm combinations for each set of priors), while the SMPA works better than both the MPA and the BPA.
Example 3 (Large Systems): In this example, we consider two large 8 systems D1 and D2 with the number of alarms and components for each system set to M = 30, N = 50 for System D1 and M = 100, N = 200 for System D2, respectively. The number of iterations is set to I = 10, and the maximum number of components per alarm for each system is limited to L = 5 (since the computational complexity of both algorithms is proportional to 2 L ). For each system, we randomly construct ten different BDGs by connecting each component with an alarm with probability L/N (we discard the resulting graph if there is an all-zero row or an all-zero column in the associated test matrix T , or if there are more than L components connecting to any alarm). Then, we assign the Z, X, or Y models for each BDG as follows. For each connection E mn , we randomly choose a parameter t mn between 0.8 and 1; for the Z model, we assign t For these large systems, it is impossible to obtain the most likely solution given any alarm observation; therefore, we compare directly the solutions of the MPA and the SMPA. For each BDG and each possible connection/alarm model (Z, X, or Y ), we consider ten sets of priors (generated by assuming that each prior probability is an i.i.d. random variable uniformly distributed between 0 and 0.1), and for each prior set, we randomly pick ten alarm observations as follows. First, we choose ten combinations S 1 , S 2 , . . . , S 10 of component failures by letting each component fail (S n = 1) independently from the others according to its prior probability. For each combination S i , we allow the state from each component S n = x, x = 0, 1 to propagate successfully to the connected alarm A m with probability t x mn , x = 0, 1. Then, at each alarm A m , we perform the OR operation and let the OR result be observed successfully with the appropriate probability (Pa
. This determines the corresponding alarm observation A. Starting from this alarm observation, we apply the MPA and the SMPA to the associated BDG to determine the suboptimal solutions S MPA and S SMPA of both algorithms and compare Pr(S MPA |A) to Pr(S SMPA |A). The results among 1000 alarm observations are given in Table V .
From Examples 2 and 3, we observe that 1) the SMPA is better than the MPA even on GBDGs (possibly with cycles) and 2) the performance of both algorithms is improved for systems with less reliable connections and less reliable alarms. Note that the same results were observed in [18] for the BPA. In addition, we also observe that the MPA solutions are almost identical to the SMPA solutions in those systems with unreliable connections and alarms; therefore, in the next example, we analyze the MPA and the SMPA performance with respect to the structure of the associated BDG by only considering systems under the Z model of connection/alarm failures.
C. MPA Versus SMPA Versus BDG Structure Example 4:
In this example, we compare the performance of the MPA and the SMPA on systems under the Z model and with different structures. In particular, we consider four systems E1-E4 having M = 10 alarms and N components with N varying from N = 10 to N = 40. As in Example 3, for each N , we randomly construct ten different BDG's, with L set to L = 5. We then consider ten different sets of priors randomly chosen between 0 and 0.1, and for each set, we randomly pick 100 alarm observations. We then determine the solutions S MPA and S SMPA of the MPA and the SMPA, respectively, for each alarm observation A (with the number of iterations set to I = N ) and compare Pr(S MPA |A) to Pr(S SMPA |A). Table VI shows the comparison results among 10 000 alarm observations.
We can see that the SMPA is better than the MPA in all systems, which agrees with our observations in previous examples. As the number of components N increases, the MPA solution is almost identical to the SMPA solution. In fact, this example (and several other examples that we have conducted) shows that the ratio C ≡ N/M L, which we call the connection sparsity, is a decisive factor. Note that, with the requirement that each component (alarm) must be connected to at least one alarm (component), the connection sparsity must satisfy C ≤ 1. As we have observed, the larger the connection sparsity C, the more closely the MPA approaches the SMPA. Intuitively, we can explain this observation as follows: as C approaches one, each component connects to one alarm on the average; therefore, the resulting BDG becomes acyclic, and the MPA 9 and the SMPA solutions are optimal according to Corollaries 1 and 2.
D. MPA on Large Sparse Systems
In previous examples, we compared the performance of the MPA and the SMPA in several systems, and we observed that both algorithms have almost identical solutions if the system has unreliable connections/alarms or high connection sparsity C. As a result, for these systems, it is usually sufficient to use the MPA for diagnosis purposes. Moreover, for large systems with these properties, the diagnosis time of the SMPA is much longer (approximately N times) than that of the MPA (refer to Table IX) but the performance is only slightly improved. Therefore, in the following examples, we focus on the performance of the MPA on large sparse systems (with limited We say that the MPA makes a good decision if, given A, the conditional posterior probability of the MPA solution S is greater or equal to that of the original combination of components S (i.e., Pr(S |A) ≥ Pr(S|A)). Our simulation results in Table VII show that, among 1000 alarm observations, the MPA always makes good decisions.
E. MPA Versus Lagrangian Relaxation Algorithm (LRA)
Example 6: Having observed that the MPA performance approaches that of the SMPA on sparse systems, we now compare the MPA and the LRA [17] , [26] on large sparse systems. In particular, since the LRA was developed for asymmetrical systems (Z model), we consider the large sparse systems D1, D2, F1, and F2 under the Z model, and we apply both algorithms for each alarm observation A generated as in Example 3. Given A and denoting the solutions of the MPA and the LRA by S MPA and S LRA , respectively, we compare Pr(S MPA |A) to Pr(S LRA |A); the results 10 among 1000 alarm observations are given in Table VIII . We also provide the average simulation time per alarm observation for both algorithms.
From the results in Table VIII , we observe that the performance of the MPA is comparable to that of the LRA on sparse systems with up to hundreds of components and alarms (systems D1 and D2). However, on sparse systems with thousands of components and alarms (system F1), the MPA works better and also requires less diagnosis time than the LRA. Since the LRA guarantees the predetermined duality gap between the best feasible and the optimal solutions [17] , the results in these examples suggest that the MPA is a more appropriate diagnosis algorithm on large sparse systems with 
F. Implementation and Timing Issues
All simulation programs were written in C and implemented on a PC with Pentium IV CPU with 2.6 GHz and 1-GB RAM. The average simulation time of the MPA and the SMPA for each alarm observation is reported in Table IX . As expected, the SMPA simulation time is approximately N times more than that of the MPA. For this reason, Table IX only shows the estimated simulation time of the SMPA on large systems F1 and F2 (the actual time if we run the SMPA simulation for 1000 alarm observations as in Example 5 is simply too long). Roughly speaking, in applications requiring prompt diagnosis, the SMPA is only suitable for systems having less than 1000 components and alarms. Furthermore, recall that there is a tradeoff between the performance and the complexity of the SMPA versus the MPA, particularly in highly connected graphs. These factors must be considered in choosing an appropriate algorithm for a given diagnosis application.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we apply an MPA to the MFD problem. We also consider an improved version of the MPA that sequentially applies the MPA to the associated BDG. Because of the exponential complexity of the maximization step, both algorithms are only applicable to sparse systems with limited number of connections per alarm. As we argued analytically and verified experimentally, the SMPA outperforms the original MPA in ABDG's because it is able to deal with multiple most likely solutions. What is more interesting is that the SMPA also outperforms the MPA in more general graphs (possibly with cycles), although an analytical justification of this does not appear to be straightforward. This performance improvement, however, comes at the cost of increased computational complexity. On systems with unreliable alarms, with unreliable connections, or with high connection sparsity, the performance of the MPA approaches that of the SMPA; furthermore, it appears that the MPA outperforms the existing LRA for fault diagnosis on large sparse systems with limited number of connections per alarm.
By establishing that reliable "OFF" alarms behave as absorption nodes during the iteration process, we have also shown that both MPAs always make correct diagnosis given some particular alarm patterns; moreover, we are able to obtain an upper bound on the performance of the two algorithms for special classes of systems. This bound is useful because, when alarms are designed to meet the requirements in Theorem 2, the proposed algorithms can be used for the diagnosis problem with very high confidence.
There are several interesting directions for future research. We have experimentally observed that, in general, the SMPA outperforms the MPA. A number of questions may be raised regarding this observation. For example, can we analytically justify this observation? How does the presence of cycles in the graphs or unreliability of alarms and/or connections affect the performance of the MPA and the SMPA? Can we further improve the MPA in terms of complexity and performance? In particular, we would like to improve the bounds on the probability of erroneous diagnosis. Another issue is that, in this paper, we have assumed that a priori components, connections, and alarms fail independently. By using appropriate graph representations, we plan to extend the application of BPAs to more general systems, where components, connections, and alarms fail in a correlated manner. We expect to investigate these challenging issues in our future work.
